Individual choice data often violates strong stochastic transitivity (SST) while conforming to moderate stochastic transitivity (MST). We propose a slightly stronger version of the MST postulate, which we call MST+, and we show that MST and MST+ retain significantly more predictive power than weak stochastic transitivity (WST).
Introduction
Consider a decision maker who is most likely to choose option x in a binary comparison against y, and, in turn, most likely to choose option y in a binary comparison against z.
Denoting by ρ(x, y) the probability of choosing x over y and by ρ(y, z) the probability of choosing y over z, we have ρ(x, y) ≥ 1/2 and ρ(y, z) ≥ 1/2.
( 1) A simple test of the transitivity of the decision maker's choices may require the decision maker to choose x most often in a binary comparison against z,
If (1) holds, then ρ(x, z) ≥ 1/2. (WST)
This basic postulate is known as weak stochastic transitivity. WST is the most permissive condition under which an analyst may obtain a coherent ranking over the choice options from binary choice data.
A more stringent transitivity criterion which is well-studied in the literature is strong stochastic transitivity:
If (1) holds, then ρ(x, z) ≥ max {ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)} .
Choice models that satisfy SST (such as the classic Logit model) are typically simple to analyze but fail to accommodate many empirically relevant phenomena.
In this paper, we consider a less studied, intermediate condition called moderate stochastic transitivity:
If (1) holds, then ρ(x, z) ≥ min {ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)} .
In Section 2, we show that MST allows for many empirically relevant choice patterns ruled out by SST, and yet has significantly more empirical bite than WST.
Our main contribution is to characterize a family of parametric models of individual choice that generate the entire range of observable choice behavior that satisfies MST. This family can prove useful in applications where SST is violated, while at the same time offering more predictive power than WST models.
Our main results are two representation theorems for choice behavior that exhibits a moderate degree of transitivity. First, we introduce a slight strengthening of MST, If (1), then
ρ(x, z) > min {ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)} or ρ(x, z) = ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, z)
which we call moderate stochastic transitivity plus, or MST+.
Theorem 1 shows that binary choice behavior over a finite set of alternatives satisfies
MST+ if and only if it is a moderate utility model (MUM). A binary choice rule ρ is a MUM
if there exists a utility function u and a distance metric d such that
In a MUM, the decision maker's ability to discriminate among any two options x and y depends both on the utility values of x and y and on their easiness of comparison given by the distance d(x, y). Note the role of the distance metric: for a given difference in value u(x) − u(y), higher values of the distance d(x, y) drive choice probabilities closer to fifty-fifty, that is, more distant options are harder to compare. The abstract metric d does not have to be the standard metric of Euclidean space: in applications, d can take the form of a statistical distance between random variables, angular distance between vectors in multi-attribute settings, and so on. In Section 5, we show that specific functional forms of u and d yield several familiar models from the discrete choice estimation literature as particular instances of MUM.
Theorem 2 enriches the domain of choice options to include lotteries over the alternatives and obtains the identification of the utility and distance parameters. By imposing the additional assumptions of continuity, linearity, convexity and symmetry, in addition to MST+, our moderate expected utility model (MEM) characterization identifies (i) a unique von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility function over lotteries; and (ii) a norm on the relevant linear space that is unique up to two scaling factors.
Section 5 relates our MUM and MEM representations to the existing literature. We show that some familiar models used to address failures of SST are particular instances of MUM.
A natural example of a MUM used in the discrete choice estimation literature is the classic binary probit model with correlated variables, which is also an example of a random utility model (RUM). Despite having a non-empty intersection, we show that MUMs neither nest nor are nested in the set of binary RUMs.
Moderate stochastic transitivity
Let Z be a finite set of choice options. A (binary, stochastic) choice rule on Z is a function ρ : Z 2 → [0, 1] such that ρ(x, y) + ρ(y, x) = 1 for every x, y ∈ Z. The number ρ(x, y) denotes the probability that the decision maker selects option x in a binary comparison against y.
Let ∧ and ∨ denote the min and max operators, respectively, so that a ∧ b = min{a, b} and a ∨ b = max{a, b}. The two most commonly studied notions of transitivity for binary choice data are weak stochastic transitivity (WST) and strong stochastic transitivity (SST):
In this paper we focus on a less studied, intermediate form of transitivity called moderate stochastic transitivity (MST):
The definitions clearly imply that SST ⇒ MST ⇒ WST. Our main results characterize the set of choice rules that satisfy a slightly stronger version of MST, namely
The only difference between MST and MST+ is that the case
is allowed by MST but ruled out by MST+.
Choice models that satisfy MST+ are convenient for two reasons. First, the MST+ condition holds in many applications in which the more restrictive SST condition is violated.
Hence, a choice model that satisfies MST+ but allows for violations of SST may provide the flexibility that is needed to accommodate empirically relevant choice phenomena. Second, MST+ is significantly more restrictive than WST, and restricting the analysis to models that conform to MST+ results in greater predictive power.
We provide four examples to illustrate how the flexibility provided by MST+ is useful compared to the more stringent SST. The classic Example 1 suggests that violations of SST must be expected when some pairs of alternatives are easier to compare than others.
Examples 2-4 show violations of SST in individual choice experiments with human and non-human subjects alike.
Example 1 (attributed to L. J. Savage, adapted from Tversky (1972) ). An individual has a difficult time comparing a trip to Paris, denoted P and a trip to Rome, denoted R, so that he is equally likely to pick either option ρ(P, R) = 1/2. The individual still has trouble deciding if the trip to Paris is enhanced by a e 5 bonus, denoted by P + . In other words, ρ(P + , R)
is still approximately 1/2. But when pressed to decide between the two Paris trip options, the individual clearly prefers the bonus, so that ρ(P + , P ) is close to 1. SST requires that ρ(P + , R) ≥ ρ(P + , P ) which is intuitively violated in this case, while MST+ only requires the more plausible inequality ρ(P + , R) > ρ(P, R).
Example 2 (Animal studies). Lea and Ryan (2015) recorded hundreds of mating decisions by female túngara frogs using three male options A, B and C. In the binary choice data, option B is chosen in 63% of the trials against A; option A is chosen in 84% of the trials against C; and option B is chosen in 69% of the trials against C. Choices therefore satisfy MST+ but violate SST.
Example 3 (Perceptual choice data). Tversky and Russo (1969) Enumerate the n options in Z = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } in such a way that ρ(x i , x j ) ≥ 1/2 whenever i ≤ j. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that choice probabilities differ whenever possible, so that the set {ρ(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] : x = y} has maximum cardinality with n(n − 1) elements.
When Z = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } has three alternatives, WST allows ρ to have six strict orderings:
MST+ rules out the last two of the six strict orderings, where ρ(
Let #W ST (n) = [n(n−1)/2]! denote the number of strict orderings allowed by WST when Z has n options, and likewise, let #M ST (n) denote the number of strict orderings allowed by MST+. The ratio #M ST (n)/#W ST (n) can be interpreted as a measure of the restriction imposed on observable choice data by MST+ compared to WST. In the case n = 3 we just showed the ratio #M ST (3)/#W ST (3) is equal to 2/3. This ratio decreases to less than 1/4 when n = 4 and less than 1/17 when n = 5. In the Appendix, we prove the ratio is arbitrarily small when n is large:
Moderate utility model
A choice rule ρ on a finite set Z is a moderate utility model (MUM) if there is a utility function u : Z → R and a distance metric d : Z 2 → R + such that, for all w = x and y = z,
In particular, by taking w = z = x = y above, it is easy to see that in a MUM we have ρ(x, y) ≥ 1/2 if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) for any x, y ∈ Z.
Taking the distance d in (2) to be the special case of the discrete metric d(x, y) = 1 if x = y and d(x, x) = 0 for all x, we obtain Debreu's (1958) cardinal utility representation:
The role of a non-trivial distance metric d in a MUM is to make the choice probabilities of options that are harder to compare closer to 1/2. It has been shown that all MUMs satisfy the MST condition (Halff, 1976) . In our first characterization result, we show that MUMs also satisfy the stronger MST+ condition. In fact, we show that MST+ is both necessary and sufficient for a choice rule to be a MUM. 
Moderate expected utility
We continue to let Z be a finite set of objects and we extend the domain of choice alternatives to the set of all lotteries over Z, denoted by ∆. We identify ∆ with the n − 1 dimensional inner product, such that, for any four lotteries w = x and y = z in ∆,
Every MEM satisfies MST+. This can be shown by repeating the argument for the MUM representation in the proof of Theorem 1. Compared to the MUM representation, however, the MEM representation is defined in the richer domain of lotteries contained in a linear vector space; it imposes linearity on the utility function U ; and it requires the distance metric to be induced by an inner product. These assumptions carry additional testable implications beyond MST+.
First, every MEM is continuous at every point in the domain except along the diagonal
Second, every MEM is linear, that is, for all 0 < α < 1 and any lotteries x, y, z ∈ ∆ we have ρ(x, y) = ρ(αx
MEM ρ is convex, that is, whenever ρ(x, y) = 1/2 and ρ(x, z) = ρ(y, z) ≥ 1/2, we have
let ρ(x, y) = 1/2 and ρ(x, z) ≥ ρ(y, z) > 1/2. If z is such that ρ(z, z ) ≥ ρ(z, z ) for any z ∈ ∆ then we must have ρ(x, z ) ≥ ρ(y, z ). And finally, the requirement that U is onto
Theorem 2. ρ is a MEM iff ρ = 1/2 is linear, continuous, convex, symmetric and MST+.
A MEM has two parameters (U, · ) where U is a linear functional and · is a norm induced by an inner product. Let 1 denote the linear functional 1(x) = x 1 + · · · + x n . Note that for every pair of lotteries x, y we have 1(x − y) = 0, that is, x − y belongs to the null space of 1 denoted ker(1). Thus, the n − 1 dimensional space ker (1) is the relevant domain for the norm in the MEM representation, and for the inner product that induces the norm.
The next proposition shows that, in the MEM representation, U is uniquely identified, and · defined on ker(1) is identified on the null space of U and on its orthogonal complement up to multiplication by positive scalars.
Proposition 2. If (U 1 , · 1 ) and (U 2 , · 2 ) are MEM representations of ρ, then:
(ii) There exists A > 0 such that x 1 = A x 2 for all x ∈ ker(U ), and
where the orthogonal complement ker(U ) ⊥ is the same for both inner products.
In the next section we show that a natural example of a MEM is the probit model with correlated variables familiar from the discrete choice estimation literature. Halff (1976) proposed the original definition of a moderate utility model, which required the existence of a utility function u and a distance metric d, and, in addition, the existence of a strictly increasing transformation
and with F (t) = 1 − F (1 − t) for all t. Since F is strictly increasing, the parameters u and d in (5) must always satisfy our definition given in (2). Conversely, for any choice rule ρ satisfying our definition as in (2) for some parameters u and d, it is straightforward to construct F such that u, d, F satisfy (5). Hence, our definition of MUM is equivalent to
Halff's.
It is easy to see that for any given MUM representation (u, d), the value F (t) such that The parameter F is not entirely superfluous, however. Theorem 1 provides an ordinal representation (2), and the degree of freedom provided by the transformation F is necessary to obtain the cardinal representation (5):
, and the set Z has at least four options, then there exists a choice rule ρ on Z which satisfies MST+ but cannot be represented as in (5).
Halff ( 
for some utility function u : Z → R. Luce (1959) showed formula (6) is equivalent to the product rule
which can be interpreted as saying that the probability of observing a choice cycle in the direction x y z x is always equal to the probability of observing a choice cycle in the opposite direction.
A generalization of formula (6) is the Fechnerian utility model from psychophysics where
for some utility function u : Z → R and some strictly increasing F : R → (0, 1). The testable implications of formula (7) are well studied (see Debreu (1958) and references therein). A result in Fudenberg et al. (2015) shows the Fechnerian formula is equivalent to two postulates when the set of options is finite. The first postulate is the mild assumption of positivity, which requires ρ(x, y) > 0 for every x, y. The second, more substantive postulate is acyclicity, which, when specialized to a binary choice setting, rules out cycles of the form
for all i = 1, . . . , n with at least one strict inequality, whenever {w i , x i } = {y f (i) , z f (i) } and
for some permutations f, g : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}.
for some utility function u and a real valued function F which is strictly increasing in the first argument and strictly decreasing in the second. Tversky and Russo (1969) showed that simple scalability is equivalent to positivity and a slightly stronger version of SST:
, and
which, compared to the original SST postulate, imposes the additional requirement that a strict inequality in the hypothesis entails a strict inequality in the conclusion.
It can be seen immediately by inspecting the formulas that (6) ⇒ (7) ⇒ (9). To see that the simple scalability model (9) is nested in MUM, note that SST+ immediately implies MST+. The failure of the reverse implications is also easily seen by examples.
An additional postulate, not shown in Figure 1 , is the quadruple condition considered by Debreu (1958) :
In a setting where Z is infinite, and under an additional stochastic continuity assumption, Debreu (1958) showed that QC implies the ρ is a Fechnerian utility model (7). It is also immediate from the definitions that a Fechnerian utility model (7) satisfies QC. When Z is finite, however, our next example shows that QC, while necessary, is not sufficient for ρ to be a Fechnerian utility model.
Example 5. Let Z = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and let ρ be a choice rule on Z with
Verifying that ρ satisfies QC is tedious but straightforward. This ρ does not admit a Fechnerian representation as in (7) QC is easily seen to imply SST+. Suppose ρ(x, y) ∧ ρ(y, z) ≥ 1/2. Then QC and ρ(y, z) ≥ 1/2 = ρ(x, x) imply ρ(y, x) ≥ ρ(z, x) and hence ρ(x, z) ≥ ρ(x, y). Also, QC and
The same argument with strict inequalities in the hypothesis implies a strict inequality in the conclusion and SST+ obtains. The converse implication fails, as our next example shows.
Example 6. Let Z = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let ρ be a choice rule on Z with
which is easily verified to satisfy SST+ but fails QC, since ρ(4, 2) > ρ(3, 1) but ρ(4, 3) < ρ(2, 1).
Examples 7 and 8, below, show that some familiar discrete choice models used to address violations of SST in the literature are particular instances of MUM.
Example 7 (binary probit). The following model was first proposed by Thurstone (1927) .
The choice rule ρ on the finite set Z = {1, . . . , n} is a binary probit model if there exists a vector of random variables X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with a joint Gaussian distribution and such that ρ(i, j) = P{X i > X j } for all i, j ∈ Z. To see that every binary probit is a MUM, let
, which is a distance metric when we exclude the possibility of perfectly correlated random variables. Then,
where Φ is the strictly increasing cdf of the standard Gaussian distribution. To obtain a MEM representation we extend ρ to the simplex ∆ of lotteries over Z by letting
where u = E[X] and Λ Λ is the covariance matrix of X.
The Bayesian probit model (Natenzon, forthcoming) restricted to binary choice is equivalent to a probit model, and hence by Example 7 the Bayesian probit is a MUM. The next example is a model proposed by Tversky (1972) .
Example 8 (Tversky's EBA). The choice rule ρ on a finite Z is an elimination-by-aspects (EBA) rule if there exist a mapping A that takes each option x ∈ Z to a set of aspects A(x) that x possesses, and a measure m over the set of all aspects such that
.
To see that every EBA is a moderate utility model, let
and let F be the strictly increasing function F (t) = 1/2 + t/2. Then it is easy to verify that
y) .
Probit and EBA are also instances of the random utility model (RUM). A choice rule ρ on a finite Z is a RUM if there exists a probability measure µ over the strict orderings on Z such that ρ(x, y) equals the probability under µ of the event in which x beats y. Block and Marschak (1959) and Falmagne (1978) characterize the set of RUMs in an abstract setting of choice options when choice data for all finite menus is available. Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) impose linearity and provide a characterization of RUM in the richer setting of lotteries. A review of the literature that tackles the characterization of binary choice RUMs is provided by Fishburn (1992) . Example 7 shows the MUM and RUM families have a non-empty intersection. Next, we show that neither MUM nor RUM nest each other.
Example 9. We slightly modify an example given in de Souza (1983) to obtain a choice rule that satisfies MST+ but is not a RUM. Let Z = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and let the choice rule ρ on Z be given by
where 0 < ε < 3/10. It is straightforward to verify that ρ satisfies MST+. Now suppose ρ is a RUM generated by the probability µ on the set of strict orderings over Z. Since ρ(2, 3) = ρ(4, 6) = 1, for any strict ordering in the support of µ in which 3 4 we also have 2 3 4 6 and therefore 2 6. This shows µ must assign zero probability to the intersection of events 3 4 and 6 2. By the same reasoning, µ must assign zero probability to the intersection of events 3 4 and 5 1; and µ must also assign zero probability to the intersection of events 6 2 and 5 1. Since µ is a probability measure, this implies ρ(3, 4) + ρ(5, 1) + ρ(6, 2) ≤ 1. But instead we have ρ(3, 4) + ρ(5, 1) + ρ(6, 2) = 3/2 − 5ε/3 > 1 and therefore ρ cannot be a RUM.
A converse, well-known example shows that RUM models can violate MST+. Let µ assign equal probability to three strict orderings x y z, y z x and z x y over the options x, y and z. Then the binary choice rule ρ generated by µ has ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, z) = ρ(z, x) = 2/3 which violates WST, and therefore also violates MST+.
A Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let Z be a finite set with n alternatives enumerated x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . Consider the set of choice rules ρ on Z which satisfy WST with ρ(x i , x j ) ≥ 1/2 whenever i ≤ j and for which the set {ρ(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] : x = y} has maximum cardinality with n(n − 1) elements. Each such ρ induces a strict ordering ρ of the n(n + 1)/2 pairs P n := {(
. This set of choice rules ρ induces #W ST (n) = [n(n − 1)/2]! different strict orderings ρ on P n .
MST and MST+ allow the same number of different strict orderings over P n which we denote #M ST (n). Now consider the addition of alternative x n+1 to the set Z.
Proof. Take a single strict ordering over P n compatible with MST. There are multiple ways to extend this strict ordering to incorporate the new pairs (
and obtain a strict ordering over P n+1 that is still compatible with MST. Since the original ordering has n(n−1)/2 pairs, there are n(n−1)/2+1 different positions to include (x n , x n+1 ).
In this way we obtain n(n − 1)/2 + 1 different strict orderings, all of which respect MST.
The total number of strict orderings over P n ∪ {(x n , x n+1 )} that satisfy MST is therefore [n(n−1)/2+1] #M ST (n). Now we take one such strict ordering and extend it to incorporate a second pair (x n−1 , x n+1 ). This pair can in principle be added into n(n − 1)/2 + 2 different positions, but placing it in the very last position would violate MST, since MST requires
The total number of strict orderings over
, (x n−1 , x n+1 )} which satisfy MST must therefore be smaller or equal to
[n(n − 1)/2 + 1] 2 #M ST (n). A simple inductive argument completes the proof.
Lemma A.2. lim n→∞ n k=1
Proof. The result can be shown by verifying that, for each n,
n(n − 1)/2 + k n(n − 1)/2 + 1 ≤ 1 + 1 n n and taking the limit as n → ∞. We leave the details to the reader.
Lemma A.1 implies that
n(n − 1)/2 + 1 n(n − 1)/2 + i and by Lemma A.2 the last expression in brackets goes to 1/e when n goes to infinity, where e ≈ 2.718 is the base of the natural logarithm. Hence for all n sufficiently large the ratio #M ST (n + 1)/#W ST (n + 1) is less than half of the ratio #M ST (n)/#W ST (n), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
For necessity, assume there exist u and d satisfying (2), and assume ρ(x, y) ≥ 1/2 and ρ(y, z) ≥ 1/2. If it were the case that ρ(x, z) < min{ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)}, then by (2) and the triangle inequality property of d it would follow that
which is a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that ρ(x, z) ≥ min{ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)}.
This first step of the necessity was also shown by Halff (1976) . Now suppose we have equality ρ(x, z) = min{ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)}. We consider the case min{ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)} = ρ(x, y), while the remaining case is analogous and left to the reader.
Representation (2) and the triangle inequality imply
Subtracting u(x) − u(y) from both sides we obtain
and therefore (2) yields ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, z) = ρ(x, z) as desired. The result is trivial when Z has n ≤ 2 alternatives so suppose n ≥ 3. Define a constant
. . , D m by:
From the definition (10) Case 2: u(x) = u(y) = u(z). The definitions of u and d imply
where the last inequality follows from the fact that we defined m to be the cardinality of {|ρ(x, y) − 1/2| : {x, y} ∈ Y } which is smaller or equal to n(n − 1)/2.
Case 4: u(z) = u(x) = u(y). The inequality follows from the same argument as in Case 2.
Case 5: u(x) > u(y) > u(z). By the definition of u we have {x, y} ∈ Y i , {y, z} ∈ Y j , and
The definition of u implies ρ(x, y) > 1/2 and ρ(y, z) > 1/2. By MST+ we have either ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, z) = ρ(x, z) or ρ(x, z) > min{ρ(x, y), ρ(y, z)}. The first case implies
above are positive and the desired inequality holds. It remains to show the inequality
Case 6: u(x) > u(z) > u(y). By the definition of u we have {x, y} ∈ Y i , {y, z} ∈ Y j , and
Case 7: u(y) > u(x) > u(z). By the definition of u we have {x, y} ∈ Y i , {y, z} ∈ Y j , and
Case 8: u(y) > u(z) > u(x). Similarly to Case 7, we have
Case 9: u(z) > u(x) > u(y). Similarly to Cases 7 and 8, we have
, the inequality follows from the same argument as in Case 5.
By Cases 1 to 10 above, d satisfies the triangle inequality and is therefore a metric. Now, we verify that the utility u and the metric d 
, and i ≤ j, if and only if
Second, ρ(w, x) ≥ 1/2 ≥ ρ(y, z) if and only if u(w) − u(x) ≥ 0 ≥ u(y) − u(z) if and only if
And, finally, 1/2 > ρ(w, x) ≥ ρ(y, z) if and only if ρ(w, x) < 1/2, ρ(y, z) < 1/2, and
, and i ≥ j, if and only if
and we are done.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let the non-constant choice rule ρ on ∆ be linear, continuous (outside the diagonal), convex, symmetric and satisfy MST+. First, we show that ρ has a unique linear extension to the n − 1 dimensional hyperplane H that contains ∆.
Lemma A.3. ρ has a unique linear extension to H = {(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n : x 1 +· · ·+x n = 1}.
Proof. Let ρ and ρ be two linear extensions of ρ and let x, y ∈ R n with x 1 + · · · + x n = y 1 + · · · + y n = 1. Let z = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) ∈ ∆. Take 0 < α < 1 sufficiently small such that 0 < αx i + (1 − α)/n < 1 and 0 < αy i + (1 − α)/n < 1 for each i. Then αx + (1 − α)z ∈ ∆, αy + (1 − α)z ∈ ∆ and, by linearity,
hence ρ and ρ must be equal.
From this point on, we identify ρ with its unique linear extension. Define the relation For each lottery x, let I(x) := {y ∈ H : ρ(x, y) = 1/2} denote the set of lotteries that are stochastically indifferent to x. Note that I(x) is an affine subspace of dimension n − 2.
Since ρ is not constant, there existx,ȳ ∈ ∆ with ρ(x,ȳ) > 1/2. By linearity, ρ is entirely determined by the values of the mapping x → ρ(x,ȳ) for x ∈ I(x). For each 1/2 < p < 1 let B(p) := {x ∈ I(x) : ρ(x,ȳ) ≥ p} be the upper contour set of elements that are stochastically indifferent tox and that are chosen overȳ with probability greater or equal to p.
Lemma A.4. B(p) is convex for all p ∈ (1/2, 1).
Proof. Let x, x ∈ B(p) and let 0 < α < 1. Since I(x) is an affine subspace, αx
Lemma A.5. B(p) is compact for all p ∈ (1/2, 1). By the linearity of U we would have U (z) = U (ȳ) and ρ(z,ȳ) = 1/2, contradicting continuity.
Proof. B(p)
Hence B(p) must be bounded and therefore compact.
Lemma A.6. The mapping x → ρ(x,ȳ) has a unique maximizerx on I(x). we must have both ρ(x,ȳ) <p and ρ(x ,ȳ) <p. Suppose ρ(x ,ȳ) ≥ ρ(x,ȳ) (the argument is entirely analogous with the reverse inequality). Let z = 2ȳ −x so thatȳ = z/2 +x /2. By linearity ρ(x, z) = ρ(x/2 +x /2, z/2 +x /2) = ρ(x,ȳ) =p. Since ρ(x, x ) = 1/2, ρ(x ,ȳ) ≥ ρ(x,ȳ) > 1/2 and ρ(ȳ, z) =p, the symmetry of ρ implies ρ(x , z) =p. But then by linearity ρ(x /2 + x /2,ȳ) = ρ(x /2 + x /2, z/2 +x /2) = ρ(x , z) =p. But then the pointx /2 + x /2, which lies in the same line asx andx , but lies outside the segment [x,x ] , would be in B(p), a contradiction.
For the rest of the proof, we denote byx the unique maximizer of x → ρ(x,ȳ) on I(x).
Lemma A.7. x ∈ I(x) and ρ(x,ȳ) = p implies ρ(2x − x,ȳ) = p.
Proof. The statement trivially holds if x =x, so suppose x =x. First note 2x 
Recall thatx is the unique maximizer ρ(x,ȳ) =p on I(x). Let B = B(p) −x for some fixed p ∈ (1/2,p). We first define an auxiliary norm · B on the n − 2 dimensional subspace I(x) −x using B as the unit ball.
Lemma A.8.
Proof. The Minkowski functional · B defined above is a norm when B is a symmetric, convex set such that each line through zero meets B in a non-trivial, closed, bounded segment (Thompson, 1996) . By definition x B ≥ 0 for all x. Moreover, if x B = 0 then x ∈ λB for all λ > 0 and therefore x = 0. Now for each α ≥ 0 we have x ∈ λB if and only if αx ∈ αλB and therefore α x B = αx B . Lemma A.7 implies x ∈ λB if and only if −x ∈ λB and therefore x B = −x B . To verify the triangle inequality, note that B is closed by Lemma A.5, and therefore x/ x B ∈ B for all x. B is also convex by Lemma A.4, and therefore
Thus,
and the triangle inequality x + x B ≤ x B + x B holds.
Proof. MST+ implies that, for any x =x in B(p), the function α → ρ(αx
is strictly increasing for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It suffices to show that if ρ(x,ȳ) = ρ(x ,ȳ) for x, x ∈ I(x) and 0 < α < 1, then ρ(αx + (1 − α)x,ȳ) = ρ(αx + (1 − α)x,ȳ). Take the point
Since ρ is symmetric, ρ(x, z) = ρ(x , z). Finally, by linearity,
Lemma A.10. · B is Euclidean, i.e., x B = x, x B where ·, · B is an inner product.
Proof. We use a characterization of inner product spaces by Gurari and Sozonov (1970) , who
showed that a normed linear space is an inner product space if and only if 1 2 x + 1 2 y ≤ αx + (1 − α)y whenever x = y = 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
If x B = y B = 1 then x, y are on the boundary of B, hence ρ(x +x,ȳ) = ρ(y +x,ȳ) = p > 1/2 and ρ(x +x, y +x) = 1/2. Since ρ is convex, for each 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 we must have ρ(αx + (1 − α)y +x,ȳ) ≤ ρ(x/2 + y/2 +x,ȳ) thus αx + (1 − α)y is on the boundary of B(q) −x and x/2 + y/2 is on the boundary of B(q ) −x for some q ≤ q . By Lemma A.9 x/2 + y/2 B ≤ αx + (1 − α)y B and therefore the norm · B satisfies (11).
Now we extend the inner product ·, · B on the n − 2 dimensional subspace I(x) −x obtained in the last Lemma to an inner product ·, · on the n − 1 dimensional subspace H −x. Let v 1 , . . . , v n−2 be an orthonormal base for the subspace I(x) −x endowed with ·, · B . Let v n−1 :=x −ȳ and for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1 let v i , v j = 0 if i = j and v i , v j = 1 if i = j. We let the norm be induced by this inner product x := x, x for all x ∈ H −x.
Lemma A.11. U and · are a MEM representation of ρ as in (4).
Proof. First, suppose ρ(w, x) ≥ ρ(y, z) > 1/2. Then w x, y z and since U represents we have U (w) > U (x) and U (y) > U (z). Let
and note that w , y ∈ H. Since U is linear, U (w ) = U (y ) = U (x) and hence w , y ∈ I(x).
By the linearity of ρ, ρ (w ,ȳ) = ρ(w, x) ≥ ρ(y, z) = ρ (y ,ȳ). Hence w −x B ≤ y −x B .
By construction,x −ȳ is orthogonal to I(x) −x, and therefore w −ȳ 2 = w −x +x −ȳ 
Next, suppose ρ(w, x) ≥ 1/2 ≥ ρ(y, z) with w = x and y = z. Then U (w) ≥ U (x) and U (z) ≥ U (y) which implies
Finally, suppose 1/2 > ρ(w, x) ≥ ρ(y, z). Then ρ(z, y) ≥ ρ(x, w) > 1/2 and the desired inequality follows from the first step.
Reversing the argument to show that
is straightforward and left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 2
Letx,ȳ,x be defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2. Let (U, · ) be any MEM representation of ρ as in (4), and let ·, · be the inner product that induces the norm.
Lemma A.12. x −x,x −ȳ = 0 for all x with ρ(x,x) = 1/2.
Proof. This holds by construction for the particular representation obtained in the proof of Theorem 2, and now we show it must hold for any representation. If x =x the statement trivially holds. Suppose x =x. By Lemma A.7 ρ(x,ȳ) = ρ(2x − x,ȳ). By the representation (4) it must be x −ȳ = 2x − x −ȳ .
Hence
x −x 2 + 2 x −x,x −ȳ + x −ȳ 2 = x −ȳ, x −ȳ = 2x − x −ȳ, 2x − x −ȳ = x −x 2 + 2 x −x,ȳ −x + x −ȳ 2 which implies 4 x −x,x −ȳ = 0 and we are done.
Lemma A.13. ρ(x,x) = ρ(x ,x) = 1/2 and ρ(x,ȳ) = ρ(x ,ȳ) implies x −x = x −x .
Proof. By the representation (4) we must have x −ȳ = x −ȳ . By Lemma A.12,
x −x,x −ȳ = x −x,x −ȳ = 0. Thus,
and therefore x −x = x −x as desired.
The expected utility function U is unique by the requirement that it is linear and that hence λ x −x 1 = λA x −x 2 and since λ > 0 we obtain x −x 1 = A x −x 2 as desired. which implies B ≥ 1/7, a contradiction.
